Memory for spatial location is typically biased, with errors trending toward the center of a surrounding region. According to the category adjustment model, this bias reflects the optimal, Bayesian combination of fine-grained and categorical representations of a location. However, there is disagreement about whether categories are malleable. For instance, can categories be redefined based on expert-level conceptual knowledge? Furthermore, if expert knowledge is used, does it dominate other information sources, or is it used adaptively so as to minimize overall error, (...) as predicted by a Bayesian framework? We address these questions using images of geological interest. The participants were experts in structural geology, organic chemistry, or English literature. Our data indicate that expertise-based categories influence estimates of location memory—particularly when these categories better constrain errors than alternative categories. Results are discussed with respect to the CAM. (shrink)

AbstractAgroecosystems in the Midwestern United States are undergoing changes that pressure farmers to adapt their farming practices. Because farmers decide what practices to implement on their land, there are needs to understand how they adapt to competing demands of changes in global markets, technology, farm sizes, and decreasing rural populations. Increased understanding of farmer decision-making can also inform agricultural policy in ways that encourage farmer adoption of sustainable practices. In this research we adopt a grounded view of farmers by interpreting (...) their decision-making through their stories of everyday life. We use a narrative analysis to identify recurrent themes that characterize farmer decisions as active negotiations between the demands of efficiency in maximizing crop yields with a desire to steward land through past, present, and future generations. Together these narratives portray farmer decisions as a place-making process that seeks compatibility among distinct aspirations for their land. (shrink)

This proceedings volume contains a selection of revised and extended papers presented at the Second International Workshop on Nonmonotonic and InductiveLogic, NIL '91, which took place at Reinhardsbrunn Castle, December 2-6, 1991. The volume opens with an extended version of a tutorial on nonmonotonic logic by G. Brewka, J. Dix, and K. Konolige. Fifteen selected papers follow, on a variety of topics. The majority of papers belong either to the area of nonmonotonic reasoning or to the field of inductive inference, (...) but some papers integrate research from both areas. The first workshop in this series was held at the University of Karlsruhe in December 1990 and its proceedings were published as Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence Volume 543. The series of workshops was made possible by financial support from Volkswagen Stiftung, Hannover. This workshop was also supported by IBM Deutschland GmbH and Siemens AG. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:No-Self, Dōgen, the Senika Doctrine, and Western Views of SoulGerhard FadenNo-Self Versus SoulFrom the very beginning of Buddhism, the concept of no-self (P. anattā, J. muga) has been at the heart of Buddhist thought. Based on this concept, Buddhist apologetics rejected the concept of Atman in the Upanishads as well as Western concepts of soul. Christian authors, on the other hand, see an unbridgeable abyss between what they call (...) "Christian personalism" and Buddhist "rejection of souls."1 However, is there really such a clear-cut distinction? Posing this question means denying it. The no-self doctrine is one of the most intricate concepts within philosophy, and words like "self" and "soul" have countless interpretations. It seems to me that the Buddhist tradition itself has not always realized the crucial point of its fundamental doctrine, just as the Western concepts of "person" and "soul" more often than not fell behind the achievements of Plato and the New Testament. Especially the Theravāda line of Buddhism has developed a very counterintuitive picture of what it is to be a human person. "There is suffering, but there is no self who suffers." The most outstanding philosopher of Mahāyāna Buddhism, Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-250), introduced a more convincing interpretation when he said that according to Buddha the self or soul does neither exist nor not exist. This interpretation too, no less than the Theravāda doctrine, can refer to the early epoch of Buddhism. In the Pāli suttas a monk named Vacchagotta asked the Buddha, "Is there a self?" The Buddha gave no response. Then Vacchagotta asked, "Is there no self?" Again the Buddha was silent.2 In any case, the teaching of no-self leaves room for many divergent interpretations. In this paper, I shall propose to understand it as an original view of what is my true being, a view that has analogues in traditional Western philosophy. The truth is one; philosophy has to demonstrate that the different doctrines are nothing but aspects of a single universe. As for the dogmatic tenets of each religion, I would propose to see them like educators of the individual's thought: they set limits, develop abilities, suggest lines of sight, and the like. [End Page 41]The Concept of No-self in Pāli BuddhismIn the limited space of this essay, I can only give some marginal remarks. For a first approach, let us look at the origins of the no-self concept in the scriptures of Pāli Buddhism. They show clearly the aim of that doctrine: it consists in the liberation from objectifying theories of the soul. In the canonical texts, we find repeatedly the formula of rejecting the five aggregates, the so-called "heaps" (Skt. skhandha, P. khandha) that form the phantom of a persistent ego: body, sensation, conceptualization, volitions, and consciousness. None of these things is really mine. The Buddha tells to his disciples as follows: "Suppose, bhikkhus, people were to carry off the grass, sticks, branches, and foliage in this Jeta's Grove, or to burn them, or to do with them as they wish. Would you think: 'People are carrying us off, or burning us, or doing with us as they wish'?" Of course, the disciples do not think so. It is neither their self nor what belongs to their self. In the same way, the Buddha instructs them to think, the ear is not yours, and the mind is not yours, and so on, and to abandon it all.3In other words, by the teaching of anattā the Buddha invites his disciples to cease identifying their true being with things like body or consciousness. Only what really is mine can be my self. The khandhas seem to be mine. To a certain degree, I can dispose of them. However, really they are not mine; on the contrary, they are my master. The teaching of no-self does not originally mean there is no self, but nothing in this world can be my self. What is my self can never be taken from me. I cannot dispose of it, and on the other... (shrink)

The square of a language L is the set of all words pp where p ∈ L. The square of a regular language may be regular too or context-free or none of both. We give characterizations for each of these cases and show that it is decidable whether a regular language has one of these properties.

According to a plausible picture of information, to acquire information is to rule out possibilities. What is the nature of these possibilities? The most natural answer---that they are possible states of the world---seems to be refuted by the existence of informative truths that are necessary, and so don't rule out any real possibilities. This seems to show that informational contents cannot be identified with the real possibilities they eliminate. Real possibilities, it seems, are too coarse-grained to do the work of (...) informational contents. ;In the first part of the dissertation, I look at two defenses of the coarse-grained conception of content. First, Stalnaker has claimed that the informativeness of necessary truths can be explained within a two-dimensional semantic framework, in which necessary truths have contingent metalinguistic contents. In Chapter 1, I argue that this metalinguistic approach misconstrues the content of mathematical truths. Second, Stalnaker has claimed that we have independent reason to adopt a coarse-grained conception of content since naturalistic views of content such as indicator views allow only for coarse-grained contents. In Chapter 2, I argue that both indicator and teleological views allow for more fine-grained contents and that, given certain assumptions, they even require them. Together, these arguments show that the best attempt to explain the informativeness of necessary truths in terms of coarse-grained entities fails, and that naturalism gives us no reason for thinking that some other attempt will succeed. Instead of explaining informativeness in terms of the elimination of real possibilities, I claim, we should explain it in terms of the elimination of more fine-grained epistemic possibilities. ;In the second part of the dissertation, I describe the characteristic features of epistemic possibilities. Chapter 3 clarifies the relevant sense of epistemic possibility by distinguishing it from related senses that have gone under the same name. I argue that P is epistemically possible for a thinker at a time just in case an operative belief that P is compatible with his operative beliefs at this time, where beliefs are called compatible, not if their contents are compatible, but if the beliefs themselves are compatible in the sense that it is possible to have them at the same time. Since epistemic possibility in this sense is a matter of what it is possible to believe, I call it epistemic possibility in the believability sense. ;In Chapter 4, I turn to the question of what sort of thing epistemic possibilities are. I argue that epistemic possibilities can be defined in terms of, but not identified with, a certain kind of fine-grained content. (shrink)

The Diagnostic Understanding of Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy: In accordance with the basic thoughts of the Guideline, Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy acts on the conviction that diagnostic revelations and therapeutic change processes are inseparable. Even if each of them is related to different functions and thus to particular demands, an efficient patient support requires the professional and proper interplay of discovery and change processes throughout her therapy. Each new discovery is per se related to a change and may set off a series (...) of further changes, which may again trigger off new discoveries. As widely known, this may also happen when this whole process and this cause-and-effect-relation are neither intended, nor planned, nor insightfully administered or understood. The authors of the Guideline are, therefore, right to not only ascertain the fact that discovering and changing in psychotherapy are joint and intertwining processes, but also to postulate that the psychotherapist has to work on this intertwining process consciously and deliberately, guided by and in accordance with her particular scientific-methodological approach. Even in the diagnostic strand of psychotherapeutic work, Gestalt Theoretical psychotherapists let themselves be guided by the “characteristics of working at the living”, as they were elaborated by Wolfgang Metzger (1962) and transferred to psychotherapeutic applications by Hans-Jürgen P. Walter (1977) and his colleagues. Simultaneously, essential anthropological, epistemological and ethical home positions of Gestalt theory are concisely expressed therein. I am going to mention them briefly, reformulating them in reference to the diagnostic remit. By doing so, the accordance with the major viewpoints of the Guideline in the description of diagnostic processes in psychotherapy should become apparent. (shrink)

Stoltenberg, G. Freies und imperatives Mandat.--Kaltefleiter, W. und Veen, H.-J. Von der Demokratie zur Delegiertenherrschaft.--Bromme, P. Meinungsfreiheit in der parlamentarischen Demokratie.

Kohlberg basamakları çerçevesine uymayan ahlâkî yargı sıklıkla geçiş basamaklarında değerlendirilmektedir. Bu konuların bir denge basamağında olmayıp, daha çok iç çatışma düzeyinde oldukları farz edilmektedir. Bu makalede, sözü edilen görüşe karşı çıkılmakta, 4 1/2 yargısının diğer herhangi bir ahlakî yargı tipinden daha tutarsız olmadığı ve Basamak 4 1/2'un ayrı bir basamak olarak kabulü gerektiği savunulmaktadır. Bu kabul ancak; ahlakî biliş mimarisinde ayrı bir köşe taşı olarak Basamak 4 1/2' u içine alan yeni bir basamak sınışandırması çerçevesi içinde mümkün olacaktır.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the European Workshop on Logics in Artificial Intelligence, JELIA 2000, held in Malaga, Spain in September/October 2000. The 24 revised full papers presented together with three invited papers were carefully reviewed and selected out of 60 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on knowledge representation, reasoning about actions, belief revision, theorem proving, argumentation, agents, decidability and complexity, updates, and preferences.

Wayne Davis (2004) argues against the thesis that knowledge claims are indexical, and he presents an alternative account of the contextual variability of our use of S knows p. In this commentary I focus on the following three points. First, I want to supplement Daviss considerations about the inability of indexicalism to deal with skeptical paradoxes by considering what the consequence would be if the indexicalists explanation of these paradoxes were satisfactory. Second, I am going to take a brief look (...) at Daviss alternative theory. Third, in the main part of my commentary I try to show that indexicalism may be true in spite of the linguistic evidence Davis presents against it. (shrink)

In the first part I argue that normic laws are the phenomenological laws of evolutionary systems. If this is true, then intuitive human reasoning should be fit in reasoning from normic laws. In the second part I show that system P is a tool for reasoning with normic laws which satisfies two important evolutionary standards: it is probabilistically reliable, and it has rules of low complexity. In the third part I finally report results of an experimental study which demonstrate that (...) intuitive human reasoning is in well accord with basic argument patterns of system P. (shrink)

Aim of the deliberation is to identify the presuppositions for the analysis of use of language on the level of semantic interpretation. Pragmatics has no self-sufficiency semantic core-theory. The requirements of theories in semantic are discussed ana further the consens and disserts of the approaches in semantic analysis is demonstrated. Special references are the problem of analytic and synthetic (W.v.O. Quine. J.J. Katz, S. Haack, H. Pumam, D. Davidson), the debat about B. Russells analysis of denoting and the critics of (...) P.F. Strawson ana K.S. Donnellan. The non-self-sufficiency of the semantic conceptualization on the level of pragmatics is valid even though semantic is deliminated through pragmatics. (shrink)

Systems of logico-probabilistic reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions that express high conditional probabilities. In this paper we investigate four prominent LP systems, the systems _O, P_, _Z_, and _QC_. These systems differ in the number of inferences they licence _. LP systems that license more inferences enjoy the possible reward of deriving more true and informative conclusions, but with this possible reward comes the risk of drawing more false or uninformative conclusions. In the first part of the paper, we (...) present the four systems and extend each of them by theorems that allow one to compute almost-tight lower-probability-bounds for the conclusion of an inference, given lower-probability-bounds for its premises. In the second part of the paper, we investigate by means of computer simulations which of the four systems provides the best balance of reward versus risk. Our results suggest that system _Z_ offers the best balance. (shrink)

Systems of logico-probabilistic (LP) reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions interpreted as expressing high conditional probabilities. In the present article, we investigate four prominent LP systems (namely, systems O, P, Z, and QC) by means of computer simulations. The results reported here extend our previous work in this area, and evaluate the four systems in terms of the expected utility of the dispositions to act that derive from the conclusions that the systems license. In addition to conforming to the dominant (...) paradigm for assessing the rationality of actions and decisions, our present evaluation complements our previous work, since our previous evaluation may have been too severe in its assessment of inferences to false and uninformative conclusions. In the end, our new results provide additional support for the conclusion that (of the four systems considered) inference by system Z offers the best balance of error avoidance and inferential power. Our new results also suggest that improved performance could be achieved by a modest strengthening of system Z. (shrink)

A SUMMARY IN ENGLISH [by Editor]The problem is to find out whether mathematical propositions are analytical, and if so, or if not, to what extent.Kant defined the analyticity in terms of Cartesian res extensa, exemplified by “A body is extended”, while he considered, because of such examples, mathematical propositions to be synthetic. The recent studies in set theory by Gödel, P.J.Cohen, etc., indicate, however, that such a proposition as the continuum hypothesis is certainly not “analytic (tautological)” in the strict sense (...) of logicists. Rather a small portion, comparatively speaking, of mathematical propositions must therefore be considered analytic relative to the definitions of fundamental conrepts in logic. Axioms, for example, are per definitionem non-analytic. Other problems that demand reöxaminations are, for instance: 1. Why is there only one unique series of the natural numbers? 2. On which ground is the factual eminence of Euclidean geometry to be founded? etc. The two assertions that mathematical propositions are analytic and that they are synthetic a priori are thus not at all contradictory; they are, to begin with, not even mutually exclusive Possibilities. (shrink)

"Was sind epistemische Werte? Welcher Wert aus der Familie: Wissen, Wahrheit, Rechtfertigung, kognitive Leistung usw. ist fundamental, so dass aus ihm die anderen Werte abgeleitet werden können? Oder gilt ein Pluralismus? Welcher Wert wird final, d.h. um seiner selbst willen, geschätzt; welcher dient nur instrumentell der Realisierung eines anderen Werts? Ist, wie die Menon-Intuition nahe legt, Wissen mehr wert als wahre Überzeugung? Die Wertschätzung von Wissen scheint in dem erwarteten Ausschluss von epistemischem Zufall begründet zu sein. Aber welche Arten von (...) epistemischem Zufall können wir überhaupt ausschließen? Welche Rolle spielen dabei rechtfertigende Gründe? Ungeklärt ist auch das Verhältnis, das Werte, Normen und Ziele in unserer epistemischen Praxis eingehen. Ist Wissen und/oder Wahrheit nicht eher als gemeinschaftlich angestrebtes, durch Institutionen reguliertes Ziel unserer Erkenntnispraxis zu begreifen? Die Fragen stehen im Schnittpunkt zweier Debatten: einmal der seit ca. 50 Jahren geführten Debatte um eine Definition des Wissensbegriffs, die den Einwänden standhält, mit denen Gettier das klassische Paradigma von Wissen als wahrer, gerechtfertigter Überzeugung unterminiert hat. Zum anderen der jüngeren, seit ca. 15 Jahren geführten Debatte um den Wertbegriff. Die hier gesammelten Beiträge sind Lösungsvorschläge für die Problemfelder, die sich in der Verknüpfung der beiden Debattenstränge neu herausgebildet haben"--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

Following Richard M. Hare1 I think that we use practical sentences as decision criteria. We understand their meaning if we know what decision to take according to them. But it is not clear, how exactly decision criteria are related to decisions and how they function as criteria. To fully understand this role, we need a formal semantics of practical sentences. For this I have to introduce a formal language and give an interpretation of it. This language has to be constructed (...) in such a way that a translation into ordinary language is always possible in principle. Thus, we make sure that our semantics and logic will have an impact on the solution of concrete practical problems. According to this program I will first introduce the formal language ‘LP1’. To give an interpretation of it I will then clarify what a decision is and show how practical sentences function as decision criteria. On this basis I give an interpretation of the primitive two-place operator ‘PT p,q’ and the one-place operator ‘VTp’. I further argue that we make meta-decisions concerning the application of first-order decision-criteria. This allows me to introduce a new concept of practical validity, which differs radically from the concept of truth. Using this concept, I then give an interpretation of the deontic operators ‘OTp’, ‘FTp’, ‘ATp’ and ‘ITp’. The concept of practical validity makes it also possible to introduce practical logical connectors and mixed logical connectors on the basis of practical or mixed value tables. These connectors are used – among others – in bridge-principles, which play an important role in ethical and juridical theories. Finally, I shortly explain the semantics of the main kinds of practical sentences, i.e. value judgments, imperatives, norms and intentions, and I argue that we need a deontic logic in order to use practical sentences in a correct way. (shrink)

An excellent comparison of the thought of the major figure in the "classic period of Roman Catholic theology" with that of "the central figure of seventeenth century [Protestant] theology." Aquinas's views on creation are succinctly summarized and provide a useful background for the exposition of Gerhard's theology. The author finds the different quality of these two theological outlooks to lie in Aquinas's awareness of man's "richness" and Gerhard's emphasis of man's "inner contradictoriness." That is to say, whereas Aquinas (...) sees the world as "reflecting the abundance of God's resourcefulness and ordering love," Gerhard sees more of creation's inner contradictions: "man trying to save himself though unable to do so...." One hopes that more such comparative studies in Catholic-Protestant thought will be forthcoming.—B. P. H. (shrink)

Les mathématiques sont bien plus qu’une science, tant elles ont acquis un statut central et tout à fait particulier. Elles sont à la fois un langage permettant d’articuler la réalité et un outil qui façonne le réel, et jouent à ce titre un rôle clé dans le développement des sciences de la nature, des sciences humaines et sociales, et de l’industrie. Leur position centrale dans les mécanismes de sélection et de reproduction qui caractérisent l’enseignement en France en fait par ailleurs (...) un enjeu social majeur. L’essence des mathématiques, c’est la liberté, disait Georg Cantor. Quelles sont les nouvelles frontières, les nouveaux défis de cette science qui ne s’impose aucune limite? Comment cette science de l’abstraction s’inscrit-elle au cœur de la réalité, au point d’être incontournable? Quel rôle, quelle place, quelle responsabilité s’assignent les mathématiciens? Deux mathématiciens, Pierre Cartier qui fut l’un des piliers du fameux groupe Bourbaki et Cédric Villani, un des représentants les plus brillants de sa génération (médaille Fields en 2010), le mathématicien et historien des sciences Jean Dhombres, et le philosophe des sciences Gerhard Heinzmann nous invitent à débattre avec eux de l’activité mathématique et de ses conséquences sociales, tant dans l’histoire de l’humanité que dans le monde contemporain. (shrink)

"Die vorliegende Arbeit wurde im Jahre 1991 von der Philosophischen Fakulteat der Universiteat Teubingen als Dissertation angenommen"--P. 11.

There are numerous formal systems that allow inference of new conditionals based on a conditional knowledge base. Many of these systems have been analysed theoretically and some have been tested against human reasoning in psychological studies, but experiments evaluating the performance of such systems are rare. In this article, we extend the experiments in [19] in order to evaluate the inferential properties of c-representations in comparison to the well-known Systems P and Z. Since it is known that System Z and (...) c-representations mainly differ in the sorts of inheritance inferences they allow, we discuss subclass inheritance and present experimental data for this type of inference in particular. (shrink)

CONCLUSIONThis brief survey of the assessment of the Resurrection of Jesus in contemporary Catholic Christology indicates the presence of widely varying views on the nature of the Resurrection, on the manner of its revelation, and on the role attributed to it in the overall structure of theology. While it is improbable that a unified consensus will be achieved in the near future, if ever, a few concluding remarks may serve to direct attention to some central issues which underlie the variations.First, (...) more explicit attention could profitably be directed to the correlation of the understanding of the nature of the Resurrection with the theological function attributed to it. It is not at all certain that all opinions on the nature of the Resurrection are compatible with all of its theoretically possible theological functions. Is it, for example, consistent to understand the Resurrection as inseparable from Jesus' death, while assessing the Crucifixion in negative terms and attributing to the Resurrection the function of legitimating the claims of the historical Jesus ? Authors such as Kiing and Kasper seem to have drawn eclectically on disparate sources without having adverted sufficiently to the problems involved in a synthesis of different conceptions. Thus their positions on the function of the Resurrection in Christology are reminiscent of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 74 while their descriptions of the connection of death and resurrection draw heavily and explicitly on Karl Rahner. It would seem, however, that Rahner's conception of the nature of the Resurrection is incompatible with Pannenberg's christological argumentation. 75 At the very least, more expb'cit discussion of this issue would help to dispel the appearance of inconsistencies in the viewpoints of some authors.Secondly, it would seem that the central disputed issue with regard to the theological function of the Resurrection is the question of the sufficiency of the historical Jesus as basis and criterion of Christology. This question is also central to current Protestant Christology, as the opposing views of Pannenberg and Gerhard Ebeling76 clearly indicate. Its discussion is unfortunately often impeded by the use of identical terminology for different referents: some who assert the sufficiency of the historical Jesus and most of those who deny it are inclined to abstract from Jesus' death when they refer to the historical Jesus, while others not only include the Crucifixion but even attribute to it a very prominent position in their understanding of Jesus' life. Now the question of the sufficiency of the historical Jesus in abstraction from his death is quite different from that of his sufficiency when his death is included. The charge that theologies which assert that the historical Jesus is sufficient basis and criterion of Christology are inevitably reductionist is quite telling when raised against those whose conception of the historical Jesus abstracts from his crucifixion, but it is not necessarily valid when directed against those who do not do this. An uncritical presumption of Pannenberg's problematic distinction between Jesus' actions and his double fate of crucifixion and resurrection 77 may be at the root of many problems here. In view of the fact that Jesus' death was the consequence of his public activity, assessment of his public life in abstraction from that death is scarcely possible. The views which assert the sufficiency of the historical Jesus while incorporating the Crucifixion into their understanding of the historical Jesus require and deserve more careful examination. They possess the major advantage that in such approaches Christology's basis and criterion is accessible historically, while other proposed criteria, such as Küng's ‘biblical Christ’ or Kasper's ‘earthly Jesus and the risen and exalted Christ’ presuppose the resolution of what Rahner rightly considers the first and most basic christological question, the legitimacy of the step from the historical Jesus to the christological kerygma of the early Church .This leads immediately to a final remark: The key to discussion of the Resurrection is the theological interpretation of Jesus' death. Although critical assessment of the theory of satisfaction and of the category of sacrifice pertain to this question, 78 the matter is far more complex than these aspects alone. Further systematic study, which could profitably draw on the renewed exegetical examination of the various interpretations to be found in the New Testament, 79 is urgently needed. Avoidance of isolation of Jesus' death from his public life is one major precondition for the development of a valid interpretation of it. 80 While neither a survey of existing opinions nor a constructive proposal can be offered here, it might be suggested, without advocating false glorification of the Crucifixion, 81 that a theology which evaluates Jesus' death in exclusively negative terms will ultimately prove unable to provide a well‐grounded positive christological assessment of his life. (shrink)